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APPLE V. PEPPER: APPLYING THE 
INDIRECT PURCHASER RULE TO 
ONLINE PLATFORMS 
JASON WASSERMAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
Long-established antitrust precedent bars customers who buy a 
firm’s product through intermediaries from suing that firm for 
antitrust damages.1 Such a policy is meant to incentivize the “direct 
purchasers,” who can recover full damages, to sue antitrust-violating 
firms2 and to encourage judicial efficiency in damage calculations.3 In 
Apple Inc. v. Pepper,4 this “indirect purchaser rule” is brought into the 
smartphone age in a price-fixing dispute between technology giant 
Apple and iPhone users.5 This case will determine whether iPhone 
users buy smartphone applications (hereinafter “apps”) directly from 
Apple through the App Store, or if Apple is merely an intermediary 
seller-agent of app developers.6 If the Court determines the latter, 
iPhone users will have no standing to sue, practically blocking any 
consumer from suing Apple for antitrust claims related to app 
distribution.7 
The indirect purchaser rule bars customers from suing antitrust-
violating firms unless those customers buy products directly from the 
firm, even when those customers were charged supracompetitive, 
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 1. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 728–29 (1977). 
 2. Id. at 746.  
 3. Id. 
 4. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 138 S. Ct. 2647 (June 18, 2018) (No. 17-204) (granting writ of 
certiorari). 
 5. Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: Justices Poised to Allow Antitrust Dispute Against 
Apple Over Apps to Go Forward, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 26, 2018, 3:51 PM), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/11/argument-analysis-justices-poised-to-allow-antitrust-
dispute-against-apple-over-apps-to-go-forward/. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
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illegal prices that resulted from the firm’s conduct.8 Customers who 
buy a firm’s products through middlemen do not have statutory 
standing to sue and cannot recover antitrust damages.9 Even when 
direct purchasers of the antitrust-violating firm “pass-on” the 
supracompetitive costs downstream to their own customers, those 
downstream customers cannot sue the original, antitrust-violating 
firm for damages. The indirect purchaser rule is not sympathetic to 
whether those downstream customers consequentially paid 
supracompetitive prices and were themselves harmed.10 
The indirect purchaser rule is simple but rigid: It prevents 
downstream victims of anticompetitive conduct from suing. The rule, 
quintessentially “bright-line,” helps prevent duplicative liability for 
antitrust defendants and obviates the need to perform complex 
calculations to allocate damages down different levels of a supply 
chain.11 But it also categorically bars any party classified as an indirect 
purchaser from bringing suit even if that party suffered significant 
anticompetitive harm.12 The rule allows direct purchasers to recover 
full antitrust damages, even when the direct purchasers pass-on illegal 
overcharges to their own customers, the “indirect purchasers,” which 
incentivizes private antitrust enforcement by direct purchasers.13 A 
buyer of a product in an antitrust suit is either a direct purchaser or an 
indirect purchaser; the former has standing to sue while the latter 
does not.14 
The indirect purchaser rule is generally considered settled 
precedent. How the rule should apply to online platforms, however, 
differs between circuit courts. Specifically, courts have split on the 
question of how to determine which users of online marketplaces are 
direct purchasers and which users are indirect purchasers.15 For 
example, the Eighth Circuit held that individuals who buy concert 
 
 8. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 728–29.  
 9. Id. 
 10. In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 2013 WL 6253147, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2013), 
rev’d 846 F.3d 313 (9th Cir. 2017), argued Apple Inc. v. Pepper, No. 17-204 (2017) (hereinafter 
“In re Apple I”) (quoting In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., 911 F. Supp. 2d 857, 
864 (N.D. Cal. 2012)). 
 11. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 746. 
 12. See In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 313, 323 (9th Cir. 2017), argued Apple 
Inc. v. Pepper, No. 17-204 (2017) (hereinafter “In re Apple II”) (calling the Illinois Brick rule 
“bright line” and applying it to determine if the plaintiff had standing to sue).  
 13. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 746.  
 14. See In re Apple II, 846 F.3d at 323. 
 15. See, e.g., id. (disagreeing with the Eighth Circuit’s analysis of how to define a direct 
purchaser).  
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tickets from intermediary ticket sellers like Ticketmaster are indirect 
purchasers for antitrust purposes, even though these individuals buy 
the tickets directly from the intermediary.16 In Campos v. Ticketmaster, 
the court concluded that the product in question (tickets) and the 
anticompetitive transaction in question involved only the 
intermediary and the original ticket-selling venue, not individual 
customers.17 The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, took a more literal 
approach that allows plaintiffs to sue intermediaries; it held that 
individuals who buy apps through platforms, such as Apple’s App 
Store, were direct purchasers from the platform simply because the 
individuals bought the product directly from the platform.18 Which 
factors go into calculating product prices or the formal structure of 
who pays whom were not important to the Ninth Circuit’s analysis. 
Instead, what mattered was the basic distribution chain and how the 
product changed hands.19 
In Apple Inc. v. Pepper, the Supreme Court has an opportunity to 
resolve the circuit split, and the Court should do so by adopting the 
Ninth Circuit’s application of the indirect purchaser rule. Rejecting 
the Ninth Circuit’s approach would bar consumers from suing 
technology platforms for antitrust damages, regardless of whether the 
consumers’ claims were likely to win in litigation. Adopting the Eighth 
Circuit’s competing approach would bar consumers from suing online 
platforms for potentially legitimate recovery and place a great burden 
on the government as the lone plaintiff available to challenge 
anticompetitive practices by technology giants. 
In this case, a class of iPhone app buyers sued Apple for 
monopolizing the iPhone app market.20 Apple iPhones make up about 
forty-four percent of the smartphone market, or 110 million iPhones 
 
 16. See Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1171 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[T]icket 
buyers only buy Ticketmaster’s services because concert venues have been required to buy 
those services first. As we explained above, such derivative dealing is the essence of indirect 
purchaser status, and it constitutes a bar under the antitrust laws to the plaintiffs’ suit for 
damages.”). 
 17. Id. 
 18. In re Apple II, 846 F.3d at 324. 
 19. See id. (“[W]e rest our analysis, as compelled by Hanover Shoe, Illinois Brick, 
UtiliCorp, and Delaware Valley, on the fundamental distinction between a manufacturer or 
producer, on the one hand, and a distributor, on the other. Apple is a distributor of the iPhone 
apps, selling them directly to purchasers through its App Store. Because Apple is a distributor, 
Plaintiffs have standing under Illinois Brick to sue Apple for allegedly monopolizing and 
attempting to monopolize the sale of iPhone apps.”).  
 20. Id. at 316. 
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owned.21 Users who want to download apps for their devices must do 
so through the Apple App Store, regardless of whether the given app 
was made by Apple or a third-party developer.22 The App Store is 
controlled exclusively by Apple,23 which takes a thirty percent 
commission on all paid app downloads.24 In total, about two million 
apps are available for download through the App Store.25 
At issue on appeal to the Supreme Court are not the merits of the 
antitrust claims, but whether the app purchasers have standing to sue 
at all. Phrased differently, the Court must decide whether the app 
purchasers are direct purchasers of apps from Apple. If so, the 
plaintiff app purchasers can proceed in bringing an antitrust suit 
against Apple. Alternatively, the Court could decide that the 
consumer app purchasers are merely indirect purchasers of Apple, 
who actually buy apps directly from third-party software developers. 
In that case, Apple would be classified as a passive middleman, 
immune to antitrust suit by app purchasers at all.26 The Court should 
take the former approach and affirm the decision of the Ninth Circuit 
holding that consumer app purchasers have standing to sue Apple’s 
App Store. Otherwise, consumers will be unable to recover for 
potentially legitimate antitrust injuries, and Apple’s conduct will be 
unlikely to be challenged by another party. 
 
 21. First, 77% of Americans own a smartphone. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MOBILE FACT 
SHEET, http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2019). Second, the 
United States population is 327 million. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, QUICKFACTS, 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/IPE120217 (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (showing 
a population estimate in the United States of 327,167,434 as of July 1, 2018). Third, multiplying 
77% by 327 million equals roughly 250 million American smartphone owners. Fourth, the 
Apple iOS operating system holds about a 44% share of the smartphone market. STATISTA, 
SUBSCRIBER SHARE HELD BY SMARTPHONE OPERATING SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES 
FROM 2012 TO 2018, https://www.statista.com/statistics/266572/market-share-held-by-
smartphone-platforms-in-the-united-states/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (showing the Apple iOS 
subscriber share as 44.4% in November 2018). Finally, multiplying 44% by the 250 million total 
smartphone owners yields an estimate of the total number of iPhone owners at 110 million. 
 22. In re Apple II, 846 F.3d at 315–16. 
 23. Id. 
 24. In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 2013 WL 6253147, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2013), 
rev’d 846 F.3d 313 (9th Cir. 2017), argued Apple Inc. v. Pepper, No. 17-204 (2017).  
 25. STATISTA, NUMBER OF APPS AVAILABLE IN LEADING APP STORES AS OF 3RD 
QUARTER 2018, https://www.statista.com/statistics/276623/number-of-apps-available-in-leading-
app-stores/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (showing that Google Play and Apple App Store, the two 
leading app stores, each offer at least two million apps for download).  
 26. See discussion infra Parts II & IV. 
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I. FACTS 
Noted above, over 100 million Americans own an Apple iPhone.27 
In addition to selling the base iPhone hardware, Apple controls which 
apps are available for download on every iPhone, including ringtones, 
instant messaging, internet, video,28 gaming, photos, and other 
functions.29 Third-party developers create many of these iPhone apps, 
but all iPhone apps must be sold to users exclusively through the App 
Store, an Apple-controlled sales channel30 through which Apple takes 
a thirty percent commission from payments for non-free apps.31 
In 2011, private class plaintiffs, angered by Apple’s exclusive 
control over iPhone app distribution, filed a putative antitrust class 
action against Apple for monopolization and attempted 
monopolization of the app market32 under the Sherman Act.33 By 
controlling the entire distribution market for iPhone apps through the 
App Store, Apple allegedly foreclosed users from buying apps from 
any other source and charged supracompetitive commissions on app 
distribution.34 
After lengthy proceedings and the filing of a second amended 
consolidated complaint,35 the district court dismissed the complaint 
under Rule 12(b)(6)36 for plaintiffs’ failing to show statutory standing 
under the Sherman Act.37 Under Illinois Brick,38 only a “direct 
purchaser”39 or the “first party in the chain of distribution” can seek 
damages for antitrust violations.40 The plaintiffs, the district court 
ruled, were not direct purchasers from Apple. Rather, they bought 
apps directly from third-party developers, and Apple merely collected 
 
 27. See supra note 21 (calculating 110 million iPhone owners in the United States). 
 28. In re Apple II, 846 F.3d at 315.  
 29. In re Apple I, 2013 WL 6253147, at *1. 
 30. In re Apple II, 846 F.3d at 315–16.  
 31. In re Apple I, 2013 WL 6253147, at *2. 
 32. In re Apple II, 846 F.3d at 316.  
 33. Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); In re Apple I, 2013 WL 6253147, at *1.  
 34. In re Apple I, 2013 WL 6253147, at *1–2.  
 35. In re Apple II, 846 F.3d at 317.  
 36. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
 37. In re Apple II, 846 F.3d at 317.  
 38. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 729 (1977) (“[W]e decline to abandon . . . that the 
overcharged direct purchaser, and not others in the chain of manufacture or distribution, is the 
[injured party].”).  
 39. In re Apple I, 2013 WL 6253147, at *3. 
 40. Id. (quoting In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., 911 F. Supp. 2d 857, 864 
(N.D. Cal. 2012)). 
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indirect fees during the purchase process.41 Because the plaintiffs were 
simply “indirect purchasers” in relation to Apple, they had no 
statutory standing to bring suit under the Sherman Act.42 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the case.43 It 
found that the plaintiffs had standing to sue under the Sherman Act as 
direct purchasers from Apple because Apple was the party 
distributing the apps.44 
In August 2017, Apple filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the 
Supreme Court, seeking reversal of the Ninth Circuit’s grant of 
standing to the plaintiff app consumers.45 In June 2018, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari.46 Robert Pepper is one of four named class 
representatives for plaintiff respondents.47 The class includes “[a]ll 
persons in the United States . . . who purchased an iPhone application 
. . . any time from December 29, 2007 through the present.”48 If the 
standing decision is reversed, the class will not be allowed to sue 
Apple, and many individuals will go without any legitimate recourse 
against Apple for the alleged monopolistic practices. 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Under the indirect purchaser rule, only the “first party in a chain 
of distribution” has statutory standing under the Sherman Act to sue 
for antitrust damages.49 This doctrine developed from two separate 
Supreme Court decisions, Hanover Shoe50 and Illinois Brick,51 that 
addressed antitrust issues associated with multiparty supply chains.52 
 
 41. Id. at *6. 
 42. Id. at *6–7. 
 43. In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 313, 325 (9th Cir. 2017), argued Apple Inc. 
v. Pepper, No. 17-204 (2017).  
 44. Id. at 324–25. 
 45. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Apple Inc. v. Pepper (2017) (No. 17-204), 2017 WL 
3393652.  
 46. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 138 S. Ct. 2647 (June 18, 2018) (No. 17-204) (granting writ of 
certiorari). 
 47. Brief in Opposition at *1, Apple Inc. v. Pepper, No. 17-204, 2017 WL 3977645 (Sept. 6, 
2017). 
 48. In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 2013 WL 6253147, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2013), 
rev’d 846 F.3d 313 (9th Cir. 2017), argued Apple Inc. v. Pepper, No. 17-204 (2017). 
 49. Id. at *3 (quoting In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., 911 F. Supp. 2d 857, 
864 (N.D. Cal. 2012)). 
 50. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).  
 51. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).  
 52. Barak D. Richman & Christopher R. Murray, Rebuilding Illinois Brick: A Functionalist 
Approach to the Indirect Purchaser Rule, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 69, 72 (2007). 
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In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., the Court 
addressed antitrust standing specifically for direct purchasers, holding 
they can recover the full value of illegal overcharges from a 
defendant, regardless of who ultimately bears the injury or whether 
those overcharges are passed down the supply chain.53 In large part, 
the rule was created to incentivize private antitrust actions by direct 
purchasers,54 or so-called “private attorneys general.”55 In this case, 
Hanover Shoe sued United Machinery (“United”) for illegal 
monopolization of the shoe machinery industry.56 United argued there 
was no injury to Hanover Shoe—and therefore no treble damages 
owed—because overcharges paid by Hanover Shoe were later passed 
to Hanover Shoe’s customers.57 The District Court rejected this “pass-
on” defense and found United liable, awarding treble damages to 
Hanover Shoe.58 Upon final appeal, the Supreme Court agreed.59 The 
Court held that even if a buyer “passes-on” illegally high prices to its 
own customers to recoup the cost, such actions do not reduce the 
amount of damages that buyer can actually recover from the 
defendant.60 
In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, the Supreme Court again rejected 
the “pass-on” damages theory, but this time for use as an offensive 
tool, intending that whatever pass-on rule was adopted would apply 
equally to plaintiffs and defendants.61 The Court decided that 
downstream customers could not recover antitrust damages passed on 
to them.62 In this case, indirect purchasers of concrete blocks sued the 
block manufacturer even though they bought the blocks from 
contractors and middlemen.63 As the Court noted, the blocks 
“passe[d] through two separate levels in the chain of distribution” 
before they reached the plaintiffs.64 The Court held that because the 
 
 53. 392 U.S. at 489. 
 54. See id. at 494 (“[I]f buyers [were] subjected to the passing-on defense . . . . [t]he[] 
ultimate consumers . . . would have only a tiny stake in a lawsuit and little interest in attempting 
a class action.”). 
 55. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 746.  
 56. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 483 (1968).  
 57. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 245 F. Supp. 258, 297 (M.D. Pa. 1967), 
vacated, 377 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1967), rev’d, 392 U.S. 481 (1967).  
 58. Id. at 272.  
 59. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 491–94. 
 60. Id. at 494.  
 61. 431 U.S. 720, 728–29 (1977).  
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. at 726.  
 64. Id.  
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plaintiffs were not direct purchasers from the manufacturer, they did 
not suffer a cognizable antitrust injury.65 The Court also concluded 
that antitrust laws would be better served by allowing direct 
purchasers to recover “the full extent of the overcharge paid by them 
than by attempting to apportion the overcharge among all that may 
have absorbed a part of it.”66 
The Court realized that such a rule denies indirect purchasers 
recovery even when they have sustained legitimate antitrust injuries. 
However, the Court was ultimately more concerned with making 
direct purchasers whole and not depleting overall recovery in 
difficult-to-calculate pass-on issues or causing duplicative liability for 
defendants.67 
Since Illinois Brick, the Court has rigidly applied the indirect 
purchaser rule.68 Indirect purchasers simply cannot sue to recover the 
portion of anticompetitive overcharges they bear; that right rests 
solely with direct purchasers who buy from the defendant firm that 
violated antitrust law(s).69 For example, in Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, 
Inc., the Court attempted to justify this rigid application by appealing 
to simplicity: “The direct purchaser rule serves, in part, to eliminate 
the complications of apportioning overcharges between direct and 
indirect purchasers.”70 As the doctrine currently stands, the bright-line 
determination of whether a plaintiff is classified as a direct or indirect 
purchaser is vital to the question of whether they will be able to 
establish standing.71 
Circuit courts disagree, however, on how to define “direct” and 
“indirect” purchasers under Illinois Brick regarding online 
distribution platforms.72 For example, the Eighth Circuit defines an 
 
 65. Id. at 746–47. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. at 746–47.  
 68. See Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 219 (1990) (“[T]he petitioners 
contend that [the statute] must allow the States to sue on behalf of consumers notwithstanding 
their status as indirect purchasers. We have rejected this argument before.”).  
 69. Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1169 (8th Cir. 1998).  
 70. UtiliCorp, 497 U.S. at 208.  
 71. See In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 313, 323 (9th Cir. 2017), argued Apple 
Inc. v. Pepper, No. 17-204 (2017) (calling the Illinois Brick rule “bright line” and applying it to 
determine if the plaintiff had standing to sue). 
 72. See, e.g., id. (“We disagree with the [Eighth Circuit] majority’s analysis in Ticketmaster. 
. . . “[A]ntecedent transaction” analysis has no basis in Supreme Court precedent.”); Campos v. 
Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166 at 1169 (An indirect purchaser is one who bears some portion 
of a monopoly overcharge only by virtue of an antecedent transaction between the monopolist 
and another, independent purchaser.”). 
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indirect purchaser as “one who bears some portion of a monopoly 
overcharge only by virtue of an antecedent transaction between the 
monopolist and another, independent purchaser.”73 In Campos v. 
Ticketmaster Corp., plaintiffs bought tickets directly from 
Ticketmaster but were deemed indirect purchasers of Ticketmaster, 
lacking standing.74 Ticketmaster was simply an intermediary for 
tickets, and thus the plaintiffs were indirect purchasers.75 Conversely, 
the Ninth Circuit eschews any test involving an “antecedent 
transaction.” Instead, the Ninth Circuit identifies the product at issue 
and then examines the “direct vertical chain of transactions.”76 When 
a distributor buys a product and then sells it to purchasers, that 
distributor can be the “appropriate defendant” for antitrust 
standing.77 Under this analysis, purchasers from distributor 
intermediaries can also be direct purchasers if the product and 
conduct in question involve distribution to the plaintiffs.78 
In In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litigation, the appealed Ninth 
Circuit decision that turned into Apple Inc. v. Pepper, the court held 
that app buyers through Apple’s App Store system are direct 
purchasers from Apple.79 The court found that consumers buy apps 
directly from Apple even when Apple does not personally create the 
apps. Significant to the court’s holding was that Apple sells and 
distributes apps made by third-party developers directly to 
consumers.80 
III. HOLDING 
The Ninth Circuit held the plaintiff iPhone app buyers were direct 
purchasers of apps from Apple regardless of whether independent 
developers created the apps, and that therefore they held sufficient 
statutory standing to sue Apple under the Sherman Act.81 The Ninth 
Circuit interpreted the indirect purchaser rule to first require 
identifying the product at issue and then simply determining if the 
 
 73. Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1169 (1998). 
 74. Id. at 1171. The ticket buyers were deemed indirect purchasers of tickets from the 
antecedent transaction between Ticketmaster and concert venues. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. In re Apple II, 846 F.3d at 323 (quoting Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 
1174 (1998) (Arnold, J., dissenting)). 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 324–25. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. 
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defendant sold that product directly to the plaintiffs.82 The product at 
issue in the case was “the sale of iPhone apps.”83  Because Apple was 
a distributor that sold iPhone apps directly to purchasers, the plaintiffs 
were direct purchasers capable of suing Apple and not barred by the 
indirect purchaser rule.84 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s decision to 
hold the that app buyers were direct purchasers was not based on any 
findings that buyers directly paid money to Apple, that there was a 
difference “between a markup and a commission,” or that Apple had 
or had not solely determined app prices.85 
IV. ARGUMENTS 
The core issue dividing the parties in Apple v. Pepper is whether 
consumer owners of iPhones have standing under the Sherman Act to 
sue Apple for anticompetitive app distribution practices, or whether 
the precedent of the indirect purchaser rule from Illinois Brick bars 
recovery.86 
Petitioner Apple, seeking reversal of the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
to grant standing, argues that the indirect purchaser rule set out in 
Illinois Brick bars the plaintiff app buyers from suing Apple. Third-
party iPhone app developers bought software distribution services—
the product at issue in the case—from Apple. Then the plaintiff app 
buyers bought iPhone apps—not the product at issue—from those 
third-party developers. That is, Apple did not directly set the price for 
or sell the software distribution services at issue to plaintiffs.87 
Meanwhile, respondents Pepper, et al., seeking affirmance of the 
Ninth Circuit’s grant of standing, argue that the plaintiff app buyers 
did have standing to sue Apple for antitrust damages: The plaintiff 
iPhone app buyers were direct purchasers from Apple because they 
bought iPhone apps—the distribution of which Apple is accused of 
monopolizing—directly from Apple through the Apple-controlled 
App Store. This store is the only place to buy iPhone apps.88 
 
 82. Id. at 323.  
 83. Id. at 324.  
 84. Id.  
 85. Id.  
 86. Brief for Respondents at *i, Apple Inc. v. Pepper, No. 17-204, 2018 WL 4659225 (Sept. 
24, 2018).  
 87. Brief of Petitioner at *2–4, *8, Apple Inc. v. Pepper, No. 17-204, 2018 WL 3870180 
(Aug. 10, 2018).  
 88. Brief for Respondents, supra note 86, at *18–19.  
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A. Petitioner’s Arguments 
Petitioner Apple argues that straightforward application of the 
indirect purchaser rule precludes plaintiffs from recovering any 
antitrust damages.89 In sum, petitioner argues that third-party app 
developers, not Apple, set app prices, so consumers who buy apps 
through the App Store are merely indirect purchasers of Apple.90 
Petitioner asserts that based on the allegations, the product at 
issue is the bundle of distribution services Apple offers to third-party 
developers for developing iPhone apps, not the distribution and sale 
of finished apps to consumers.91 Petitioner reaches this conclusion by 
focusing on the “market realities”92 of the App Store and classifying it 
as a “two-sided”93 platform, where the product sold to third-party app 
developers is a separate product from that sold to the consumer 
plaintiffs.94 Petitioner relies on Ohio v. Am. Express Co., a 2018 
Supreme Court case that created a framework for understanding 
electronic platforms that connect user groups, noting that “a two-
sided platform offers different products or services to two different 
groups.”95 
Petitioner created the following chart to explain its theory of the 
structure of iPhone app transactions.96 
 
 
 89. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 87, at *20. 
 90. Id. at *3.  
 91. Id. at *36.  
 92. Id. at *34–35.  
 93. Id. at * 35.  
 94. Id. at *36.  
 95. Id. (quoting 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2280 (2018)). 
 96. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 87, at *8; see also id. at *8 n.2 (“The graphic captures the 
important point—the agent/principal nature of the relationship between Apple and app 
developers.”).  
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Petitioner argues that the antitrust claims of the plaintiffs involve 
only the services Apple sells to third-party developers, not the 
products sold to “[e]nd [u]sers,” and that the plaintiffs are merely end 
users.97 Therefore, the plaintiff app purchasers are barred from 
bringing suit because the only possible damages recovered from 
Apple would require a pass-through theory of harm, which is 
distinctly barred by the indirect purchaser rule.98 
Additionally, Petitioner asserts that only third-party developers set 
app prices, which makes Apple a mere agent of app developers.99 
Because the price of apps is set entirely by the third-party developers 
who make the apps, Apple claims that any illegal overcharges paid by 
plaintiffs were passed-through Apple from those third-party 
developers to reach the plaintiffs.100 Ultimately, Petitioner argues that 
a “pass-through” theory of antitrust harm is precluded by Hanover 
Shoe, Illinois Brick, and the related progeny of cases.101 
Accordingly, as indirect purchasers with no theory of harm except 
for “pass-through” damages from third-party developers, the plaintiffs 
lack standing to recover antitrust damages from Apple.102 
B. Respondents’ Arguments 
Respondents argue the app buyers fit neatly into the Illinois Brick 
precedent as direct purchasers: The plaintiffs “cannot purchase apps 
through any other means” than the Apple-controlled App Store, and 
the plaintiffs pay Apple the allegedly supracompetitive prices 
directly.103 Therefore, because they are direct purchasers, app 
purchasers have standing to sue Apple for antitrust damages.104 
First, respondents classify the product at issue in the case, taken 
directly from the plaintiffs’ antitrust allegations, as the retail sale of 
apps to consumers.105 Similar to a brick-and-mortar retailer, Apple 
 
 97. Id. at *36, *40–41.  
 98. See id. at *40–41 (“In that setting, consumer app purchasers could only seek damages 
based on a pass-through theory of harm barred by Illinois Brick.”). 
 99. Id. at 35. 
 100. Id. at *40–41. 
 101. Id. at *3. 
 102. Id. at *40–41. 
 103. Brief for Respondents, supra note 86, at *1, *12. 
 104. Id. at *12 (“[R]espondents purchase apps directly from Apple through Apple’s App 
Store; they claim that Apple violated the Sherman Act by monopolizing the retail market for 
apps; and they assert that Apple’s unlawful conduct is responsible for the overcharges they have 
suffered. Accordingly, they can seek damages from Apple under the Clayton Act.”). 
 105. Id. at *14, *24–25.  
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owns and operates its own store, sells iPhone apps directly to 
consumers, and then pays upstream iPhone app developers.106 
Respondents paint Apple as significantly more than a mere 
intermediary or agent of app developers.107 
In addition to selling apps directly to plaintiffs, respondents argue 
that Apple has total control over the pricing and selling process of 
iPhone apps.108 Apple requires that “all prices in the app store must 
end in 99 cents” and also “retains the contractual right to change 
unilaterally” agreements with app developers and iPhone owners, 
including the ability to “set every price” in the App Store.109 And even 
if app developers have some “discretion” in setting app prices as 
Apple contends, that is not material to whether consumers can sue 
because Apple “could decide tomorrow that it wants to set every 
price.”110 Respondents also note that Apple monopolizes the app 
market “at the retail level,” and since Apple is the only party that can 
sell apps to iPhone owners, the only reasonable conclusion is that app 
buyers purchase apps directly from Apple.111 And even if Apple 
reclassifies the product at issue as “app-distribution services,” rather 
than “apps” sold to consumers, plaintiffs would still be direct 
purchasers because Apple provides app distribution services to both 
third-party developers and consumers.112 
Second, respondents advocate for sticking vehemently to the 
bright-line indirect purchaser rule from Illinois Brick because 
underlying policy considerations help the respondents’ case.113 
Respondents assert that granting statutory standing would not 
threaten duplicative liability on Apple because the app buyers are the 
only party capable of suing Apple for unlawful monopoly overcharges 
for app sales.114 Any harms suffered by app developers would be 
separate from damages owed to plaintiffs, because the damages would 
involve framing Apple as a monopsonist: the sole buyer of iPhone 
apps made by developers.115 However, in the present case with the app 
 
 106. Id. at *27. 
 107. Id. at *15.  
 108. Id.  
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at *14.  
 112. Id. Apple could reclassify the product at issue for argument because Apple, as the 
defendant, did not write the complaint. Id.  
 113. Id. at *38.  
 114. Id. at *39.  
 115. Id. at *40.  
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buyers, Apple is a monopolist as the sole seller of iPhone apps.116 
Further, specific calculations of damages paid to plaintiffs would not 
overlap with those paid to app developers because the sides buy 
different services at different levels of the app distribution process.117 
Respondents also recognize that American antitrust law favors 
and encourages private actions, exemplified by the ability of plaintiffs 
in antitrust suits to recover treble damages.118 If the app buyers do not 
challenge Apple’s anticompetitive conduct, what other private party 
will? App developers do not have an incentive to sue Apple because 
they may benefit from Apple’s practices. And any app developers who 
do have an incentive to sue Apple under antitrust law would have a 
separate cause of action for being underpaid, not overcharged, from 
Apple’s conduct.119 The plaintiff class of iPhone owners is hailed as 
the “best positioned” to bring the case.120 
In sum, respondents argue that the plaintiff iPhone app purchasers 
are direct purchasers of apps from Apple, wielding proper standing to 
sue Apple under the Sherman Act, supported by both straightforward 
application of case law and by policy considerations surrounding the 
indirect purchaser rule as first cemented in Illinois Brick. 
V. ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court should affirm the Ninth Circuit’s decision by 
classifying the iPhone app buyers as direct purchasers, thereby 
granting them standing to sue Apple. Such a result is a proper 
application of the indirect purchaser rule and aligns with the policies 
underlying antitrust statutes. 
1. Both App Buyers and App Developers Are Direct Purchasers of 
Apple 
Illinois Brick does not require that there be only a single direct 
purchaser; rather, each victim of an antitrust violator may sue as a 
direct purchaser for its own “distinct harm[s].”121 In this case, app 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. at *46.  
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. at *17.  
 121. Brief of Antitrust Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at *7, Apple 
Inc. v. Pepper, No. 17-204, 2018 WL 4773103 (Oct. 1, 2018).  
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developers and app buyers should both be classified as direct 
purchasers of Apple. 
Although Apple sells two similar but separate products—to app 
developers, the ability to create and sell apps to consumers; to 
consumers, finished apps—the harms suffered by each party stem 
from the same alleged monopolistic conduct on the same platform.122 
Notwithstanding Petitioner’s arguments, Apple does not sell only to 
app developers, who then sell to consumers; it sells directly to both 
app developers and consumers.123 Petitioner’s theory that app 
developers set prices and that illegal overcharges paid by plaintiffs are 
merely passed through Apple should hold no weight.124 
App developers, were they to sue Apple, would face completely 
separate antitrust injuries from the same alleged conduct, so Apple 
would not face duplicative liability if the plaintiff app buyers are 
allowed to proceed.125 The app buyers are “differently situated 
plaintiffs” than would be the app developers in a hypothetical lawsuit, 
and each party would be “seeking remedies for ‘different injuries in 
different markets.’”126 Injuries suffered by app developers, who are 
essentially suppliers, would be calculated as lower profits or sales 
while the injuries suffered by app buyers, in the present case, would 
stem from supracompetitive prices paid for apps.127 
Petitioner asserts that Apple has no say in the prices set by app 
developers.128 But Apple controls the entire iPhone app distribution 
market via the App Store and uses price controls.129 For example, 
payments from app buyers go first to Apple, which then distributes of 
 
 122. See In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 313, 315–16 (9th Cir. 2017), argued 
Apple Inc. v. Pepper, No. 17-204 (2017) (“The iPhone is a ‘closed system,” meaning that Apple 
controls which apps . . . can run on an iPhone’s interface.”).  
 123. See id. (“Apple prohibits app developers from selling iPhone apps through channels 
other than the App Store, threatening to cut off sales by any developer who violates this 
prohibition. Apple discourages iPhone owners from downloading unapproved apps, threatening 
to void iPhone warranties if they do so.”) (emphasis added).  
 124. See at Brief of Amicus Curiae Open Markets Institute in Support of Respondents at *5, 
Apple Inc. v. Pepper, No. 17-204, 2018 WL 4846925 (Oct. 1, 2018) (“This monopolistic control 
of iPhone-app distribution enables Apple to dictate terms to both iPhone users and iPhone app 
developers.”).  
 125. Brief for Respondents, supra note 86, at *2. 
 126. Id. (quoting Loeb Indus., Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp., 306 F.3d 469, 481 (7th Cir. 2002)). 
 127. Id. at *2–3. 
 128. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 87, at *3 (“[T]he developer always independently sets its 
app prices. Apple does not set app prices for third-party developers.”).  
 129. See In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 313, 315–16 (9th Cir. 2017), argued 
Apple Inc. v. Pepper, No. 17-204 (2017) (discussing Apple’s controls over the App Store). 
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a portion of the proceeds to app developers.130 Apple also has the 
unilateral ability to approve which apps are available for sale.131 An 
arbitrary, formalistic distinction between how money changes hands 
between parties would allow monopolists, especially those running 
platforms like Amazon and Google, to simply restructure transactions 
to remove the ability for consumers to sue them, thereby dodging 
antitrust liability.132 Claims that Apple is merely a passive 
intermediary simply because Apple operates a transactional platform 
are unfounded. The App Store is a quintessential monopoly that 
guides app developers’ hands and from which the plaintiff app buyers 
directly purchase every app.133 Both app buyers and developers are 
direct purchasers of distinct services, and their economic injuries are 
inextricably linked to the same monopolistic conduct. 
2. Declining to Grant Standing to the Plaintiff App Buyers Would 
Stifle Private Antitrust Enforcement and Leave Anticompetitive 
Conduct Unpunished 
If the Court accepts Petitioner’s arguments—that iPhone app 
buyers are not direct purchasers of Apple—Apple’s conduct will 
likely go unchallenged.134 Although the federal government can bring 
antitrust suits with a broad grant of jurisdiction, it has limited 
resources.135 Additionally, private antitrust suits are a congressionally 
intended cornerstone of policing antitrust violators, indicated by the 
availability of treble-damages.136 In Hanover Shoe, the Court noted 
that without private antitrust suits, “those who violate the antitrust 
 
 130. Id.  
 131. Id.  
 132. See Brief of Antitrust Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 
121, at *7 (“Petitioner’s theory would further undermine enforcement by permitting 
monopolists and cartelists to avoid liability through clever transaction structuring.”).  
 133. See In re Apple II, 846 F.3d at 315–16 (“Apple prohibits app developers from selling 
iPhone apps through channels other than the App Store, threatening to cut off sales by any 
developer who violates this prohibition.”). 
 134. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968). The Court in 
Hanover Shoe noted that if “no one [is] available who would bring suit” against an antitrust-
violating firm, that firm will “retain the fruits of their illegality.” Id. If iPhone consumers, the 
only private party incentivized to bring suit, are unable to establish standing, then Apple will 
likely go unpunished. Id.  
 135. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 4 (2012) (“[I]t shall be the duty of the several United States 
attorneys, in their respective districts, under the direction of the Attorney General, to institute 
proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations.”).  
 136. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977) (observing congressional intent to 
enforce antitrust laws via private suits); see also Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 494 (exclaiming the 
importance of private, treble-damage antitrust actions).  
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laws . . . would retain the fruits of their illegality because no one 
[would be] available to bring suit against them” and that “[t]reble-
damage actions, the importance of which the Court has many times 
emphasized, would be substantially reduced in effectiveness.”137 
Incentivizing private antitrust suits is why the Court in Hanover Shoe 
allowed direct purchasers to recover full damages even when illegal 
overcharges were passed down the supply chain.138 
If app developers were deemed the only direct purchasers of 
Apple, then there would not be any antitrust challenges to Apple 
because the app developers are unlikely to bring suit. The Court in 
Illinois Brick acknowledged that “[w]e recognize that direct 
purchasers sometimes may refrain from bringing a treble-damages 
suit for fear of disrupting relations with their suppliers.”139 In the 
present case, iPhone app developers must sell their apps via Apple, so 
it is likely they would be hesitant to sue Apple despite being direct 
purchasers.140 
Moreover, some app developers may actually benefit from 
Apple’s monopoly by sharing in the monopoly profits, meaning the 
app developers “may not wish to assert claims to the overcharge.”141 
Apple charges a thirty percent commission on app sales142 and 
dictates how app developers sell their products, but app buyers must 
buy apps through Apple and may pay supracompetitive prices, 
allowing developers to happily ride the coattails of Apple’s monopoly 
control by reaping overcharges themselves.143 
CONCLUSION 
Denying antitrust standing to the plaintiff app buyers in Apple Inc. 
v. Pepper would misapply the indirect purchaser rule to online 
platforms and cripple private antitrust enforcement by foreclosing 
millions of private plaintiffs from bringing antitrust actions. For these 
 
 137. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 494.  
 138. Id. at 488, 494; see also Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 746 (1977) (discussing direct purchasers as 
“private attorneys general”).  
 139. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 746.  
 140. In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 313, 316 (9th Cir. 2017), argued Apple Inc. 
v. Pepper, No. 17-204 (2017). 
 141. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 739–40.  
 142. In re Apple II, 846 F.3d at 316.  
 143. Richman & Murray, supra note 52, at 94 (“Because illegal cartels and monopolists can 
share rents with direct purchasers without explicitly including them in an illegal conspiracy (and 
threaten to boycott those who bring suit) antitrust violators can manipulate the incentives of the 
only parties who have standing.”). 
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reasons, the Supreme Court should affirm the judgment of the Ninth 
Circuit and grant the consumer app purchasers standing. 
